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Abstract
Realistic quantum mechanics based on complex probability theory is shown
to have a frequency interpretation, to coexist with Bell's theorem, to be linear,
to include wavefunctions which are expansions in eigenfunctions of Hermitian
operators and to describe both pure and mixed systems. Illustrative examples
are given. The quantum version of Bayesian inference is discussed.
1. Introduction
Quantum mechanics can be reformulated as a realistic theory where quantum eects
arise from a breakdown of conventional probability theory rather than from the usual wave{
particle duality. Consider, for example, the two slit experiment where a source emits a single
particle which travels towards a wall with two slits and is detected at position x on a screen
located behind the wall. The usual argument concluding that an interference pattern on the
screen implies that the particle did not either go through one slit or the other is ultimately
an argument in probability theory where
P(x) = P(x via slit 1) + P(x via slit 2) (1)
is the critical statement. As an alternative, it is possible to consider a realistic theory, where
the particle does go through one slit or the other, but where (1) fails due to a failure of
probability theory itself. The basic consequences of this idea and its consistency with Bell's
theorem and with other limitations on local realism are discussed in references 1 and 2. Here
we develop this approach in more detail with emphasis on insights which are not available
in standard quantum mechanics.
2. Probability Theory as Physics
Probability theory is often introduced as a theory of experiments which may succeed
or may fail due to some random inuence. If an experiment is successful n times in N
trials, one calls the large N limit of n=N the \probability of success." Probability theory
then results from assuming that these probabilities follow Kolmogorov's axioms.
3
For our
purposes, however, it is convenient to adopt the more general Bayesian view where, given
a pair of propositions (a; b), probability P (a; b) gives a non{negative real number meant to
measure how likely it is that b is true if a is known.
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One can then follow Cox
5
and assume
that P (a; b ^ c) = F (P (a; b); P (a^ b; c)) and P (a;:b) = G(P (a; b)) for some xed functions
F and G and derive the Bayesian form of probability theory. A function P mapping pairs
of propositions into the interval [0,1] is a probability if
(a) P (a; b ^ c) = P (a; b)P (a ^ b; c), (2)
(b) P (a; b) + P (a;:b) = 1, (3)
(c) P (a;:a) = 0 (4)
for all propositions a, b and c. In its Bayesian form, probability theory is just a consistent
way of assigning a \likelihood" in the interval [0,1] to any pair of propositions whether or
not these propositions refer to the outcome of a random experiment.
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As we will see, the
2
Bayesian view is essential for constructing and understanding the predictions of our extended
probability theory.
To derive a frequency interpretation for ordinary probabilities, let p be the probability of
success in an experiment and note that by the central limit theorem, the number of successes
n in N independent copies of the experiment is asymptotically gaussian with mean  = Np
and with = proportional to 1=
p
N . The probability for n=N to be in any interval not
containing p can then be made arbitrarily small by increasing N . Thus, we have a frequency
interpretation provided that we assume that an arbitrarily small probability for n=N to be
in some interval means that n=N is never actually observed to be in that interval, or, more
generally, that P (a; b) = 0 means that b is never observed if a is known to be true. As
innocent as it seems, this additional property brings probability theory into the domain
of physics and leads to a question: does such a P exist? If we assume that there is no
conventional probability P with this additional property, Cox's remaining axioms may still
be preserved provided probabilities are allowed to be complex.
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Since Bayesian probabilities
are not dened as frequencies, it is possible to consider complex probabilities provided a
consistent frequency interpretation can be constructed after the fact (section 3). In the
complex case, Cox's arguments follow as before and the resulting complex probability theory
has exactly the same form as (2){(4), only with a complex P . In order to distinguish complex
probabilities from the conventional case, an arrow notation is used so that the complex
probability that b is true given that a is known is denoted by \(a ! b)" rather than by
\P (a; b)." The arrow is meant to suggest a numerical version of implication.
We are now ready to attempt a description of quantum phenomena by combining
complex probability with a simple denition of realism. An arrow function mapping pairs of
propositions into the complex numbers is a quantum theory if
I. The arrow is a complex probability:
(a! b ^ c) = (a! b)(a ^ b! c) (I.a)
(a! b) + (a! :b) = 1 (I.b)
(a! :a) = 0 (I.c)
for all propositions a, b and c and if
II. There exists a set U (the state space) and a real time t such that:
x
t
^ y
t
= false if x 6= y (II.a)
(a
t
! b
t
00
) = (a
t
! U
t
0
^ b
t
00
) (II.b)
(a
t
^ x
t
0
! b
t
00
) = (x
t
0
! b
t
00
) (II.c)
for all x; y 2 U , for all propositions a; b and for all times t  t
0
 t
00
with U
t
 _
x2U
x
t
.
The realistic state axioms (II.a{II.c) guarantee that a system cannot be in two states
at once (II.a), that a system is in some state at each intermediate time (II.b) and that the
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knowledge that a system is in some particular state makes all previous knowledge irrelevant
(II.c). For the purposes of this paper, it is convenient to add the following technical
assumptions: III. U is a measure space and for any times t  t
0
for any proposition a
t
,
(a
t
! U
t
0
) =
R
x2U
(a
t
! x
t
0
) and (a
t
! U
t
0
) is dierentiable with respect to t
0
. Note that
unlike the \state space" of conventional quantum mechanics, U is not a Hilbert space.
Many simple facts from probability theory also follow in quantum theories. For all
propositions a, b and c, (a ! a) = 1, (a ! true) = 1, (a ! false) = 0 and (a ! b _ c) =
(a ! b) + (a ! c)   (a ! b ^ c) and, if (a ! b) 6= 0 then (a ^ b ! c) = (a ^ b ! b ^ c).
It is convenient to call a proposition e
t
normal if
R
x2U
je
t
! x
t
0
j
2
exists and is greater than
zero for all t
0
 t and to let a time subscript on a set of propositions denote the or of all
its elements: W
t
= _
w2W
w
t
. Following probability theory, propositions a and b are said to
be independent if (q ^ a ! b) = (q ! b) for all propositions q. The rest of this work is an
exploration of the consequences of I-III.
3. Reconstructing a Frequency Interpretation
As discussed above, the physical meaning of conventional probability is xed by the
assumption that if proposition a is known and if P (a; b) = 0, then b never happens in real
experiments. Since, however, complex probabilities may sum to zero without being zero
individually, we make this assumption for (a ! b) only if b = x
t
for some x in the state
space. More generally, if U is a quantum theory, t  t
0
, e
t
is a normal proposition and a and
b are any propositions, dene a function Prob by
Prob(e
t
; a
t
0
) =
R
x2U
je
t
! a
t
0
^ x
t
0
j
2
R
x2U
je
t
! x
t
0
j
2
(5)
and
Prob(e
t
; a
t
0
^ b
t
0
) =
R
x2U
je
t
! a
t
0
^ b
t
0
^ x
t
0
j
2
R
x2U
je
t
! x
t
0
j
2
(6)
where, under conditions described below, Probwill be shown to have many of the properties of
a conventional probability and, in particular, provides a frequency interpretation for quantum
theories.
Supposing that U is a quantum theory and W is a set of propositions, we say that W
supports probabilities with initial knowledge e
t
if e
t
is normal and if, for all t
0
 t, for all
A;B W ,
(a) A
t
0
^ A
c
t
0
= false and U
t
0
implies W
t
0
(7)
(b) Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
^B
t
0
) = Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
) Prob(e
t
^ A
t
0
; B
t
0
) (8)
(c) Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
) + Prob(e
t
; A
c
t
0
) = 1 (9)
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where the complement A
c
= W   A. Following the standard argument sketched in
the previous section, if Prob has these properties for a set of propositions W , then the
probabilities Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
) have a frequency interpretation. The conditions under which W
supports probabilities can be easily found.
Theorem 1 (Orthogonality). If U is a quantum theory, e
t
is a normal proposition and
W is a set of propositions satisfying point a) above, then W supports probabilities with
initial knowledge e
t
if and only if, for all times t
0
 t and for all subsets A of W ,
R
x2U
(e
t
! A
t
0
^ x
t
0
)

(e
t
! A
c
t
0
^ x
t
0
) + (e
t
! A
t
0
^ x
t
0
)(e
t
! A
c
t
0
^ x
t
0
)

= 0.
Proof. We need to show that W supports probabilities with initial knowledge e
t
.
Condition (a) above is already assumed, (b) follows easily from the denition of Prob, and
(c) follows since (e
t
! x
t
0
) = (e
t
! W
t
0
^x
t
0
) = (e
t
! A
t
0
^x
t
0
)+(e
t
! A
c
t
0
^x
t
0
) and therefore
1 =
R
U
je
t
! x
t
0
j
2
=
R
U
je
t
! x
t
0
j
2
= Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
)+Prob(e
t
; A
c
t
0
)+I(A)=
R
U
je
t
! x
t
0
j
2
where
I(A) is the integral in the theorem. Similarly for the reverse implication.
Since the state space U of a quantum theory trivially satises the conditions of theorem 1, U
supports probabilities with any normal initial knowledge, and given any A  U , Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
)
has a proper frequency interpretation and thus predicts how often a system will be found in
region A at time t
0
given that e is known at time t.
It is useful to consider extending the denition of Prob to mixed times. If, for normal e
t
with t  t
0
 t
00
we were to dene
Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
^B
t
00
) =
R
x2U
je
t
! A
t
0
^ B
t
00
^ x
t
00
j
2
R
x2U
je
t
! x
t
00
j
2
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then
Prob(e
t
; A
t
0
^B
t
00
) =
R
U
je
t
! A
t
0
^ x
t
00
j
2
R
U
je
t
! x
t
00
j
2
Prob(e
t
^A
t
0
; B
t
00
) (11)
which does not generally satisfy (2) unless t
0
= t
00
. In particular,
R
x2U
je
t
! A
t
0
^ x
t
00
j
2
=
R
x2U
j
R
y2U
(e
t
! A
t
0
^ y
t
0
)(y
t
0
! x
t
00
)j
2
and, if one could take the square inside the integral
(and assuming Prob(y
t
0
; U
t
00
) = 1), (2) would be satised. Since this fails because of the
\interference terms" involved in exchanging the square with the integral, this suggests that
an appropriate classical limit would restore probability theory (2){(4) for propositions with
mixed times. In addition, this failure demonstrates the reason that Bell's theorem does
not rule out quantum theories in spite of the fact that they are realistic and local. In
Bell's analysis,
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two spin
1
2
particles in a singlet state are emitted towards two distant
Stern{Gerlach magnets. Let e
t
dene the known orientations of the two magnets and the
description of the initial singlet state and let M
t
00
be a description of one of the possible
results of the nal measurements. Let t be the time when the singlet state is released, t
00
5
be the time of the nal measurement and let t < t
0
< t
00
. Bell's argument is an argument
in probability theory beginning with an expansion in \hidden variable"  in state space U :
P (e
t
;M
t
00
) = P (e
t
; U
t
0
^M
t
00
) and so
P (e
t
;M
t
00
) =
Z
2U
P (e
t
; 
t
0
^M
t
00
) =
Z
2U
P (e
t
; 
t
0
)P (e
t
^ 
t
0
;M
t
00
) (12)
which, from our point of view, fails in the last step since t
0
6= t
00
. Thus, although Bell's
theorem is usually interpreted as ruling out local realistic theories, in a more general context
Bell's result actually shows that one must choose between local realism and conventional
probability theory. Discussion of other limitations on local realistic theories can be found in
reference 2.
4. Examples of Quantum Theories
In order to provide some examples, it is helpful to begin the process of classifying quantum
theories by their global properties. For example, one expects many quantum theories to be
time invariant in the sense that for any propositions a and b, (a
t
! b
t
0
) = (a
t+
! b
t
0
+
) for
all times t; t
0
;  . If such a quantum theory is also conservative in the sense that U
t
0
implies
U
t
for all t  t
0
, then we have
Theorem 2. If a quantum theory U is conservative and time invariant, then there exists a
function  : U ! C and a complex number  such that (U
t
! x
t
0
) = e
(t
0
 t)
(x) for all
x 2 U and for all times t < t
0
.
Proof. Let t < t
0
< t
00
and f( ) = (U
t
! U
t+
). Then using the axioms and the
conservative property, (U
t
! U
t
00
) = (U
t
! U
t
0
^ U
t
00
) = (U
t
! U
t
0
)(U
t
0
! U
t
00
) and so
f(a + b) = f(a)f(b) for all real a; b > 0. Since f is dierentiable (by III), f(a) = e
a
for
some complex  and (U
t
! x
t
0
) = (U
t
! U
t
0
^x
t
0
) = (U
t
! U
t
0
)(U
t
0
! x
t
0
) and the theorem
is proved if we let (x) = (U
t
0
! x
t
0
) which is time independent by the time invariance
property.
In the conventional view of quantum mechanics, theorem 2 is puzzling. After assuming very
little about the system, one has concluded that the wavefunction is an energy eigenstate
	(x; t) = e
t
(x). What if the system is, in fact, not in an energy eigenstate but is instead
in a superposition of two dierent energy eigenstates? To answer this question, recall that
a complex probability (a
o
! b
t
) is the best estimate of the truth of b
t
given that a
o
is
known. However, if some additional fact X is also known, one should instead calculate
(a
o
^X ! b
t
). Thus, a wavefunction such as 	 should not be mistaken for \the state of the
system." 	 merely represents the best estimate of the complex probabilities for x
t
(x 2 U)
given that only U
o
is known at t = 0. Since dierent observers may have dierent knowledge
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about a system, they may also describe a single system with dierent wavefunctions. This
also implies that if an observer does not know all the relevant facts about a system, the
corresponding wavefunction may give incorrect predictions. This, however, is not a failure of
quantum theory any more than it is a failure of probability theory when the usual analysis
of throwing a die fails in the case of a loaded die. In both cases, the theories are successful
only if the relevant facts are known. To answer the original question, it is not possible for
a superposition of two energy eigenstates to be the optimal description of the system unless
some additional fact X is known in addition to U
o
. To take another example, consider a
particle conned in a box containing some known but time invariant potential and where one
initially knows only that the particle is somewhere in the left half of the box. One expects
that, typically, this initial information will be become less useful as time goes on until
nally, the initial knowledge has no inuence on the optimal wavefunction. This suggests
that we call a quantum theory forgetful if, for all propositions a; b; c and for all times t,
(a
t
^ b
t
0
! c
t
00
) = (b
t
0
! c
t
00
) in the limit t
0
; t
00
! 1. As might be expected, you can
easily show that forgetful, conservative, time invariant quantum theories evolve into energy
eigenstates independent of the initial knowledge of the system.
For an example with more detailed predictions, consider a conservative, time invariant
quantum theory U with a trap   U in the sense that 
t
) 
t
0
for all t  t
0
. Since U is
conservative, 
t
0
) 
t
where   U    [since 
t
0
) U
t
0
) U
t
= (
t
_ 
t
)]. By arguments
similar to the proof of theorem 2, one can show that for some complex ; k
o
, (
o
! 
t
) = e
t
and (
o
! 
t
) = k
o
(1  e
t
). Given that the system is not initially trapped, the probability
to remain outside the trap for an additional time t is
Prob(
o
; 
t
) =
R
x2U
j
o
! 
t
^ x
t
j
2
R
x2U
j
o
! x
t
j
2
=
R
x2
j
o
! x
t
j
2
R
x2
j
o
! x
t
j
2
+
R
x2
j
o
! x
t
j
2
(13)
and since
R

j
o
! x
t
j
2
=
R

j
o
! 
t
^ x
t
j
2
= je
t
j
2
R

j
t
! x
t
j
2
and similarly
R

j
o
! x
t
j
2
=
R

j
o
! 
t
^ x
t
j
2
= jk
o
(1  e
t
)j
2
R

j
o
^ 
t
! x
t
j
2
and so
Prob(
o
; 
t
) =
1
1 + k(t)je
 t
  1j
2
(14)
where k(t) = jk
o
j
2
R

j
o
^ 
t
! x
t
j
2
=
R

j
t
! x
t
j
2
. If, in addition, U is forgetful, then k(t)
is time independent in the large t limit and, assuming that  is real and negative, results in
the usual exponential decay law. If  is a single point in the state space then, using II.c, k(t)
is time independent for all t and if t is real and negative, has the expected large t behavior.
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As an even more detailed example, one can extract the complete dynamics of a scalar
particle in a time invariant quantum theory with a state space U = R
d
. Since, for any
initial proposition e
o
, the wavefunction (e
o
! x
t
) is given by (e
o
! x
t
) = (e
o
! U
o
^ x
t
) =
R
y2U
(e
o
! y
o
)(y
o
! x
t
), the time development of any initial wavefunction is determined
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by the \propagator" (x
t
! x
0
t
0
). One can now construct a path integral by choosing times
t
o
< t
1
< t
2
< : : : < t
n
with t
o
= t and t
n
= t
0
. Letting x
j
denote \x
j
2 U is true at time
t
j
," with x
o
= x and x
n
= x
0
, repeated application of II.b gives
(x
o
! x
n
) =
Z
x
1
: : :
Z
x
n 1
(x
o
! x
1
)(x
1
! x
2
) : : : (x
n 1
! x
n
): (15)
As shown in reference 1, by repeating the same argument, each interval (x
j
! x
j+1
) can
be expanded into a sub{path integral which can then be reduced to a convolution by letting
t
j
! t
j+1
and inverted with a fourier transform. As a result, for small t
0
  t, jx
0
  xj, the
propagator (x
t
! x
0
t
0
) is
(x
t
! (x+ z)
t+
) =
1
(2 )
d
2
p
det[]
exp( 

1
2
(
z
j

  
j
)W
jk
(
z
k

  
k
) + 
0

) (16)
where 
o
(x), 
j
(x), 
jk
(x) andW
jk
(x) are moments of (x; z;  )  (x
t
! (x+z)
t+
) dened
by 
0
(x) =
R
z2U


(x; z; 0), 
j
(x) =
R
z2U


(x; z; 0)z
j
, and 
jk
(x) =
R
z2U


(x; z; 0)z
j
z
k
,
withW
jk
= M
jl
M
T
lk
!
l
whereM is the matrix which diagonalizes 
jk
such thatM
T
lj

jk
M
km
=

lm
=!
l
. With velocity v
j
given by the limit of z
j
= , the above propagator is equivalent to
the Lagrangian
L(x; v) =
i
2
(v
j
  
j
)W
jk
(v
k
  
k
)  i
0
(17)
which, by renaming the various moments, produces the Schrodinger equation for d = 3
or the Klein{Gordon equation for d = 4 (with t identied as the proper time) where the
particle mass, static vector and scalar potentials and metric (W
jk
) all appear as moments
of (x
t
! x
0
t
0
). Notice that in contrast to the usual procedure, we have not assumed that the
action is given by a classical Lagrangian or that the theory is Lorenz or gauge invariant.
Quantum theories also provide a convenient way to incorporate assumptions about an
experiment directly into complex probabilities even if a solution to the full dynamics is
not available. Consider, for example, the simple interferometer depicted in gure 1 where
a photon encounters a beam splitter (S
1
) followed by a mirror (M
1
or M
2
) and a second
beam splitter (S
2
) thus reaching detector D
1
or D
2
via path P
1
and Q
1
or via path P
2
and
Q
2
. To simplify matters, ignore the photon polarization and consider a quantum theory
with U = R
3
. Let e represent the initial description of the apparatus and photon, let P
j
= \The photon is on the path P
j
at a time t after the rst beam splitter is encountered
but before the mirror is encountered," and similarly for Q
j
and let proposition D
j
be true
if the photon reaches some chosen point at the entrance to detector D
j
. Suppress time
subscripts for convenience. Then, assuming that D
j
implies both P
1
_ P
2
and Q
1
_ Q
2
,
(e! D
j
) = (e! (P
1
_ P
2
) ^ (Q
1
_ Q
2
) ^D
j
) and using P
1
^ P
2
= Q
1
^ Q
2
= false,
(e! D
j
) =
X
n;m
(e! P
n
)(e ^ P
n
! Q
m
)(e ^ P
n
^ Q
m
! D
j
): (18)
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Figure 1. A photon interferometer as described in the text where a single photon
() encounters a beam splitter (S
1
), one of two mirrors (M
1
or M
2
) and a second
beam splitter (S
2
) before entering one of two detectors (D
1
or D
2
). The photon
may either reach its detector by path P
1
and Q
1
or by path P
2
and Q
2
.
If P
n
and Q
m
are single points in U , then using II.c and assuming that (P
n
! Q
m
) is zero
unless n = m, (e! D
j
) is given by the sum of the complex probabilities for the two paths
(e! D
j
) =
2
X
n=1
(e! P
n
)(P
n
! Q
n
)(Q
n
! D
j
): (19)
Assume that (e! P
n
) = k
1
e
idn=2e=2
, (P
n
! Q
n
) = e
i=2
and (Q
n
! D
j
) = k
2
e
idn6=je=2
where k
1
and k
2
are complex constants and where dae denotes the function which is 1 if a
is true and 0 if a is false. Thus, (e! D
1
) = 0 by cancellation of the two paths and since
Prob(e;D
1
) is proportional to j(e! D
1
)j
2
, there will be no counts observed in detector D
1
.
Suppose, now, that the mirror M
1
is attached to a spring and to a device H which has two
states: \hit" if the oscillation in the spring has ever been above some threshold and \nohit"
otherwise. Equation (18) follows as before, but (19) does not since P
n
is no longer a point
in the enlarged state space U
0
= R
3
fhit;nohitg. Use subscripts e, P , Q and D to indicate
9
times, so that hit
Q
denotes \H is in state `hit' at the time when Q is evaluated" etc., and
let e
0
= e ^ nohit
e
. By the denition of Prob in the new state space U
0
, Prob(e
0
;D
1
) is
proportional to je
0
! D
1
^ hit
D
j
2
+ je
0
! D
1
^ nohit
D
j
2
. If H is completely successful
at measuring whether a photon has struck M
1
, then we can assume that hit
D
) Q
1
and
nohit
D
) Q
2
and hit
D
) hit
Q
) nohit
P
. Thus,
(e
0
! D
1
^ hit
D
) = (e
0
! P
1
^ nohit
P
^Q
1
^ hit
Q
^D
1
^ hit
D
)
= (e
0
! P
1
^ nohit
P
)(P
1
^ nohit
P
! Q
1
^ hit
Q
)(Q
1
^ hit
Q
! D
1
^ hit
D
) (20)
and since there are no longer two terms to interfere, Prob(e
0
;D
1
) is no longer zero. At the
other extreme, if H is far from sensitive enough to determine if M
1
has been struck by the
photon, we can assume that hit
t
and nohit
t
are independent of P
j
, Q
j
and D
j
for all t. Then
(e
0
! D
1
^ hit
D
) is equal to
X
h;h
0
2fhit;nohitg
(e
0
! h
P
)(h
P
! h
0
Q
)(h
0
Q
! hit
D
)
2
X
n=1
(e
0
! P
n
)(P
n
! Q
n
)(Q
n
! D
1
) (21)
and thus (e
0
! D
1
^ hit
D
) = (e
0
! D
1
^ nohit
D
) = 0 and the previous prediction of no hits
in D
1
is restored, as expected. The same mechanism for removing irrelevant propositions
by assuming independence is also the source of the \locality" of quantum theories. For
example, if two unrelated experiments e
1
and e
2
have possible results r
1
and r
2
respectively,
then the assumptions that fr
1
; r
2
g, fe
1
; r
2
g and fe
2
; r
1
g are independent allow the expected
conclusion (e
1
^ e
2
! r
1
^ r
2
) = (e
1
! r
1
)(e
2
! r
2
).
5. Basic Properties of Quantum Theories
In section 4, we have seen that an energy eigenfunction should not be viewed as a state
of the system, but rather as the best description of a system given certain initial knowledge.
In particular, if only U
o
is known, an energy eigenstate is the best description of the system
in a conservative, time invariant quantum theory. In eect, energy eigenstates arise from a
nearly complete lack of knowledge of where the system is in the state space. As might be
expected, eigenfunctions of other operators arise in a similar way. Given a quantum theory
U with normal initial knowledge e
o
and given a Hermitian operator Q, let
q(V ) =
R
V
	

(x)Q	(x)
R
V
	

(x)	(x)
(22)
where V  U and 	(x) = (e
o
! x
o
). If 	 and Q	 are continuous and if there is no reason
to choose q(V ) 6= q(V
0
) for any V; V
0
 U , 	 must be chosen from among the eigenfunctions
of Q. If Q
j
= 
j

j
denes the eigenfunctions of Q, let
b
j
=\The system, at time t = 0, is best described by 
j
"
(23)
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so that b
j
^ b
k
= false if j 6= k and, by assumption, _
j
b
j
= true. Therefore
(e
o
! x
o
) = (e
o
! _
j
b
j
^ x
o
) =
X
j
(e
o
! b
j
)(e
o
^ b
j
! x
o
) =
X
j
(e
o
! b
j
)
j
(x) (24)
which provides an expansion of the initial wavefunction in eigenfunctions of Q. Since Q
is Hermitian, its eigenfunctions are orthogonal, and, by theorem 1, fb
1
; b
2
; : : :g supports
probabilities with initial knowledge e
o
and so
Prob(e
o
; b
j
) = je
o
! b
j
j
2
R
U
j
j
(x)j
2
R
U
je
o
! x
o
j
2
(25)
has a frequency interpretation. To put this expansion in a more familiar form, let
a
j
= (e
o
! b
j
)(
R
U
j
j
(x)j
2
=
R
U
je
o
! x
o
j
2
)
1
2
, 	(x) = (e
o
! x
o
)=(
R
U
je
o
! x
o
j
2
)
1
2
and
 
j
(x) = 
j
(x)=(
R
U
j
j
(x)j
2
)
1
2
so that 	(x) =
P
j
a
j
 
j
(x) where the  
j
(x) are eigenfunctions
of Q and where Prob(e; b
j
) = ja
j
j
2
. We have thus derived what is usually taken as the
expansion postulate in conventional quantum mechanics.
In conventional quantum mechanics, a sharp distinction is made between pure states,
which can be described by a single wavefunction and statistical mixtures, which must,
in general, be described by a density matrix. Since probability theory itself is no longer
available to us, these \statistical mixtures" must be described entirely within complex
probability theory. To investigate this issue, consider several situations which require density
matrices in conventional theory. First, consider a system with initial knowledge e
o
which
is known to be well described by one of the wavefunctions  
1
;  
2
; : : : which may or may
not be orthogonal. This would normally be represented as a mixture. As before, we have
(e
o
! x
o
) =
P
j
(e
o
! b
j
) 
j
(x) where b
j
= \The system at t = 0 is best described by  
j
."
Thus, in a quantum theory, not knowing which  
j
best describes a system is no dierent
from a pure superposition of  
j
. To put it another way, all such expansions can be considered
as mixtures with, in general, complex probabilities as coecients and where a \statistical"
mixture is only a special case. Density matrices are also needed in the case of \open systems"
where S  U is \the system" and R = U   S is the rest of the world. If e
S
summarizes
the initial knowledge of the system S, then with x 2 S,  (x) = (e
S
! x
o
) is the initial
wavefunction, as usual. In quantum theory, the single function  (x) is sucient to describe
S independent of what is known about the rest of the world if, for propositions e
R
about
the rest of the world, (e
S
^ e
R
! x
o
) = (e
S
! x
o
) which is just the condition that e
R
and
x
o
are independent. As a nal example, consider a composite quantum theory U = U
a
U
b
where Hermitian operator
~
A satises
~
A
j
= ~a
j

j
(
j
: U
a
! C) and Hermitian operator
~
B
satises
~
B 
k
=
~
b
k
 
k
( 
k
: U
b
! C). Following reference 10, evaluate the expectation value
of
~
A. For convenience, let all propositions implicitly be evaluated at time t = 0 and dene a
j
= \U
a
is best described by 
j
" and b
k
= \U
b
is best described by  
k
." With initial normal
11
knowledge e, fa
1
; a
2
; : : :g supports probabilities by virtue of theorem 1 and so we can dene
the expectation value <
~
A >=
P
j
~a
j
Prob(e; a
j
). Using the denition of Prob,
<
~
A >=
X
j
~a
j
Z
x
a
2U
a
Z
x
b
2U
b
(e! a
j
^ x
a
^ x
b
)

(e! a
j
^ x
a
^ x
b
)=Z (26)
where Z =
R
U
a
R
U
b
je ! x
a
^ x
b
j
2
. Since _
k
b
k
= true and using the orthogonality of
(e! a
j
^ b
k
^ x
a
^ x
b
) in both indices,
<
~
A >=
X
j;k;m
Z
U
a
Z
U
b
(e! a
j
^ b
k
^ x
a
^ x
b
)

~
A(e! a
m
^ b
k
^ x
a
^ y
b
)=Z (27)
and so
<
~
A >=
X
k
je! b
k
j
2
Z
U
a
Z
U
b
(e ^ b
k
! x
a
^ x
b
)

~
A(e ^ b
k
! x
a
^ x
b
)=Z: (28)
Let the wavefunction \relative to b
k
" be dened by 	
k
rel
(x
a
; x
b
) = (e ^ b
k
! x
a
^
x
b
)=(
R
U
a
R
U
b
je ^ b
k
! x
a
^ x
b
j
2
)
1
2
. Then
<
~
A >=
X
k
Prob(e; b
k
)
Z
x2U
	
k
rel
(x)
~
A	
k
rel
(x) (29)
agrees with the result from reference 10 where a demonstration is also given that no single
wavefunction dened on U
a
gives the correct marginal distributions for all operators dened
on U
a
.
From these examples, we conclude that quantum theories are able to naturally describe
mixtures without requiring extension of the axioms. Of course, in the case of the spin of an
electron, a density matrix rather than a superposition is required to represent, for example,
an unpolarized particle. Although we do not treat spin here, this observation indicates that
spin cannot be described by a quantum theory with a two element state space.
There has been special recent interest in precision tests of quantum mechanics and in
the question of whether non{linear extensions of quantum mechanics are possible.
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Since
linearity is assumed in conventional quantum mechanics, it is not possible to investigate this
question within the usual framework. We can, however, show that linearity is a consequence
of axioms I-III. Let proposition e be the description of an experiment and let E be a set of
propositions describing a set of possible initial conditions. For convenience, suppress a t = 0
subscript on all propositions and let 	
a
(x) = (e ^ a! x) for any proposition a. Introduce
~a = \The system is best described by 	
a
" and
~
b = \The system is best described by 	
b
"
and let z(e;E; a; b) = f((e ^ e
0
! ~a); (e ^ e
0
!
~
b)) : e
0
2 Eg. Linearity of quantum theories
is then guaranteed by the following.
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Theorem 3 (Linearity). If e is a proposition and E is a set of propositions and U is a quantum
theory, then, for any pair (; ) 2 z(e;E; a; b) such that + 6= 0, there exists a proposition
c such that (+ )	
c
(x) = 	
a
(x) + 	
b
(x).
Proof. Let (; ) 2 z(e;E; a; b) and let e
0
satisfy (e ^ e
0
! ~a) =  and (e ^ e
0
!
~
b) = .
The case where ~a =
~
b is trivial. Otherwise, let w = e^e
0
^ (~a_
~
b). We have (w! x) = (w!
(~a_
~
b)^x) [since (e^ e
0
! ~a_
~
b) = + 6= 0] which equals (w! ~a^x)+(w!
~
b^x) which
equals (w! ~a)	
a
(x)+(w!
~
b)	
b
(x). Since (w! ~a) = =(+) and (w!
~
b) = =(+),
the theorem is proven if we let c = e
0
^ (~a _
~
b).
Since the proof of theorem 3 only uses the complex probability axioms, the linearity of
quantum theories is a direct result of the addition of probabilities in I.b and so a non{linear
extension of quantum mechanics would not be consistent with complex probability theory
or with Cox's axioms.
6. The Bayesian View of Complex Probabilities
One of the benets of realistic quantum theories based on complex probability is a simple
explanation of the puzzling, not quite paradoxical problems in quantum mechanics involving
the collapse of the wavefunction, non{local eects and the role of the observer in the theory.
Within realistic quantum theories, all of these problems are ultimately due to mistaking the
wavefunction for the state of the system as discussed in section 4. Here we illustrate how
the idea that a wavefunction represents knowledge about a system and not it's state
12
arises
in the Bayesian view of complex probabilities.
The puzzling phenomenon of wavefunction collapse can be illustrated by imagining a
wave packet which strikes a barrier causing part of the wave packet to be reected to the
left and part to be transmitted to the right. After some time, a box on the right is sealed
and a device tests (with 100% eciency) whether there is a particle in the box. If the test
is successful, a repeated measurement must also be successful with probability 1, and so the
wave packet on the left must, instantaneously and mysteriously, travel to the box on the right,
penetrate its walls and join the right half of the wave packet. However, from the point of
view of a realistic quantum theory, after striking the barrier, the particle did either go to the
left or the right and the diverging wave packets only represent the fact that we do not know
which way it actually went. The collapse of the wavefunction just corresponds to learning
a new fact about the system and using that fact in calculating new complex probabilities.
Since this is only a change in the description of the system, it does not correspond to
anything actually happening to the particle, the box or to the observer. Similarly, in the
EPR experiment as described above in the discussion of Bell's theorem, the measurement
of one of the spins has no eect on the remote particle and so, for instance, it should not
13
be possible to use EPR correlations for non{local communication.
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This dierence between
viewing the wavefunction as a representation of what one knows about a system rather than
its state is directly analogous to the dierence between the classical view of a probability as
something determined by an underlying random phenomenon and the Bayesian view where
a probability represents what one happens to know about a system.
6
The same point can be illustrated once again by Schrodinger's cat, who is put in an opaque
box with a device which will kill it with probability
1
2
. In the mysterious version, after the
device has acted, it would not be correct to say that the cat is either alive or dead until an
observer opens the box and looks, causing the wavefunction of the cat to collapse into one of
the two alternatives. However, consider, for comparison, the classical problem of a six sided
die in an opaque box. If the upward face of the die is unknown, a Bayesian would describe
this situation with a \superposition" p
j
= 1=6, j = 1; : : : ; 6 (determined, for instance, by
maximizing entropy) and there would thus be a \collapse of the probability distribution"
when the box is opened and the die face is revealed. However, the \superposition" p
j
and
collapse is not mysterious at all precisely because p
j
is not mistaken for the \state of the
die." Similarly, the mystery of Schrodinger's cat disappears if one takes the Bayesian view
of complex probabilities.
Since, as we have seen, wavefunctions only represent what is known about a system
rather than its state, quantum theory should also be useful for systematically improving
wavefunctions based on prior information in the same sense that Bayesian inference
6
is
used to improve probability distributions. Analogues of both components of Bayesian
inference are available in quantum theories since Bayes theorem follows [if (a ! b) 6= 0,
then (a ^ b ! c) = (a ! c)(a ^ c ! b)=(a ! b)] and since a suitable maximum entropy
principle has already been proposed and successfully used in many{body problems.
14
7. Summary
Starting with complex probability theory and a simple statement of realism, we are able to
derive much of what is assumed in conventional quantummechanics including the probability
interpretation, the superposition principle, the expansion postulate and the wave equation
including static elds and a metric. These quantum theories have a convenient treatment
of mixed systems which are represented without extension to the axioms. The Bayesian
view of complex probabilities provides an easy understanding of the EPR experiment, Bell's
theorem and the other mysterious problems in conventional quantum mechanics and suggests
a program for improving wave functions analogous to Bayesian inference in probability
theory. It remains to be seen whether particles with spin, multi{particle systems, bosons and
fermions and eld theories can also be based on complex probability theory. Open questions
about the fundamentals of quantum theories also remain. In particular, the sense in which
14
probability theory is restored in the classical limit needs to be quantied. It might also be
possible to show that the state axioms are a consequence of the complex probability axioms
in the sense that they are required for a frequency interpretation to exist.
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